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PRIVACY, POLICE POWER, AND THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC 
POWER IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: A NOT SO 
UNLIKELY COEXISTENCE 
CAROL NACKENOFF∗ 
 The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the 
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has 
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy 
have become more essential to the individual; but modern 
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his 
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.1 
 
 Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.2 
 
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published The Right to Privacy in 
the Harvard Law Review in 1890 because they were concerned that the 
modern era provided inadequate safeguards for protection of the private 
realm and the “right to one’s personality.”3  With the emerging recognition 
of a “man’s spiritual nature,” feelings, and intellect, came the 
acknowledgement of “the right to enjoy life—the right to be let alone.”4  
Brandeis and Warren argued that if thoughts, emotions, and sensations 
demanded legal protection, that the common law was beautifully capable of 
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 1.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890). 
 2.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 3.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207.  
 4.  Id. at 195.  The authors cite Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the 
Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract for the concept of the right “to be let alone.”  From 
the 1880 edition: “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be 
let alone.”  THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH 
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & Company, 1880). 
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growing to afford such protections, and judges could “afford the requisite 
protection, without the interposition of the legislature.”5  The notion of 
battery, for example, was expanded to offer “a qualified protection of the 
individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and 
excessive vibration,” and the law of nuisance developed.6  The common 
law was vibrant, useful, and far from dead. 
Influential from the time it was published at the outset of the 
Progressive Era, the Warren and Brandeis article was a harbinger of a new 
wave of concern for personal privacy and for legal protections thereof.  It is 
noteworthy—but not surprising—that this escalating interest in the right to 
be let alone developed alongside expanded use of common and statutory 
law to extend state power over children, juveniles, and families of poor and 
working class residents and citizens, as well as over Native American 
families and others who were seen as economically dependent, vulnerable, 
or irresponsible.  Eileen McDonagh has even characterized the Progressive 
Era as an era of negative civil rights, with legislatures actively curtailing the 
civil rights of particular groups.7  Ken Kersch argues that progressive 
reformers did not so much discover individual rights, as displace and 
marginalize pre-existing rights claims with their own (and constitutionally 
enshrined) rights conceptions.8  He further points to “the tension at the heart 
of liberal political cultures between their animating commitment to the 
prerogative of the individual concerning his conscience and his choices, and 
the recognition . . . that the essence of government is to guide and to 
coerce.”9  At certain times, the question of when it is justifiable to coerce 
individuals—because of perceived reform imperatives and perceived 
threats—in order to protect or advance public morals becomes highly 
politicized, implicating the boundaries between public and private.10  And, 
“[a]s a practical matter, these arguments will often be subsumed within 
arguments about law, be it (judge-made) common, statutory, or 
constitutional.”11  The Progressive Era was just such a period of 
contestation, involving redefinition of public and private.12 
                                                          
 5.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. 
 6.  Id. at 194. 
 7.  Eileen L. McDonagh, The “Welfare Rights State” and the “Civil Rights State”: Policy 
Paradox and State Building in the Progressive Era, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 225, 236 (1993). 
 8.  KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004). 
 9.  Ken I. Kersch, The Right to Privacy, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 217 
(David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., rev. & expanded ed. 2008). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Carol Nackenoff, The Private Roots of American Political Development: The 
Immigrants’ Protective League’s “Friendly and Sympathetic Touch,” 1908–1924, 28 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 129 (2014); see also Kersch, supra note 9, at 217–19, 240. 
 314 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:312 
Despite the near-certainty of many progressive activists that acute 
social and economic problems would yield to advances in the social 
sciences and social ethics, there was pushback from those who had differing 
understandings of rights, whether parental rights or rights of business 
owners.13  Contestation between groups over the redefinition of boundaries 
between public and private is hardly surprising.  However, the fact that 
Brandeis both supported many progressive initiatives that might be seen as 
privacy-limiting and was also an early leader in the call for more privacy 
rights begs for further investigation.  According to Neil Richards, 
Brandeis’s views evolved, and he changed his mind about privacy and free 
speech after co-authoring The Right to Privacy.14  However, in David 
Bernstein’s assessment, Brandeis was “far from a consistent civil 
libertarian” when viewed from the position of those living in post-Warren 
Court America.  For Bernstein, Brandeis was “a transitional figure in 
writing opinions that served as a bridge between the statist Progressives of 
the early twentieth-century and mid-century legal liberals.”15  I contend that 
it is productive to consider the nature of the balance Brandeis struck, not 
only because it provides clues into the worldviews of a subset of 
progressive reformers, but also because it reveals something more about 
how distinctions between public and private were being drawn—
distinctions with legacies. 
The intersection of new governmental capacities and new conceptions 
of rights must be closely interrogated in any attempt to understand changing 
notions of private and public in this period.  How were changing 
borderlands between private and public understood, and what was the role 
of common law, criminal law, and constitutional law in policing them, 
given that the progressive agenda of reform included expanding the role of 
the state? 
Acknowledging the existence of different strains within progressivism 
can help when thinking about tensions between rights, including rights to a 
private sphere and a private self: Walter Weyl was not Jane Addams, and 
Woodrow Wilson was not Theodore Roosevelt.  This much is true, but 
insufficient for our purposes.  Progressive reform did not love unalloyed 
appeals to rights, despite Brandeis’s defense of privacy rights. 
                                                          
 13.  See DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 430 (2013) (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 30–31 (1910)); see also JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL 
ETHICS (1902).  On resistance to the reform agenda, see Kathleen S. Sullivan & Carol Nackenoff, 
Family Matters as Public Work: Reformers’ Dreams for the Progressive Era Juvenile Court, 
American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303396; KERSCH, supra note 8, at ch.2; Kersch, supra note 9. 
 14.  Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 
1298–99 (2010). 
 15.  David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a 
Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2014). 
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The recognition of a private sphere that was insulated from state 
oversight or intrusion depended on a judgment about what kind of citizen 
the judges, legislators, or public administrators confronted.  While Warren 
and Brandeis spoke of “inviolate personality” or the “right to one’s 
personality” in universal terms, they seemed to rely upon particular notions 
of moral personhood.16  This Paper considers the development of privacy 
alongside robust rationales for state intrusions on what opponents saw as 
family or individual prerogatives—matters of the private sphere—during 
the waning years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the 
twentieth.  William Novak argued that “on the whole, the law and language 
of individual rights were not antagonistic to state building,” but he 
nevertheless thought that the “uneasy alliance of state and individual, power 
and liberty” was held together by the displacement of common law by 
constitutionalism in the twentieth century.17  I suggest, instead, that the 
displacement may not have been so clean, leaving boundary issues between 
public and private unresolved in a number of arenas even in the early 
twenty-first century. 
I.  REFORM: THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW, POLICE POWERS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The growth of the state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries is generally studied as the expansion of the federal government 
and its administrative apparatus.  States and courts are cast as losers as 
power was wrested away from these traditional sources of authority during 
political struggles.18  While such an account marginalizes courts as 
backward-looking impediments to progress, loathed by many reformers of 
the era, many progressive legal scholar-activists saw the judiciary’s role as 
crucial.19  And they were not wrong.  A number of important social welfare 
reforms began with the courts at the state and municipal level.20  Lawyers 
and law school faculty, including such high profile figures such as Roscoe 
                                                          
 16.  See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205, 207 (respectively).  
 17.  WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 245 (1996). 
 18.  See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982) for the fullest treatment of this 
thesis. 
 19.  This was especially true with the juvenile court and new, specialized courts.  See 
ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF 
JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA (1998); VICTORIA GETIS, THE JUVENILE 
COURT AND THE PROGRESSIVES (2000); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE 
MAKING (2004); MICHAEL WILRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE 
ERA CHICAGO (2003); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). 
 20.  Carol Nackenoff & Kathleen S. Sullivan, The House that Julia (and Friends) Built: 
Networking Chicago’s Juvenile Court, in STATEBUILDING FROM THE MARGINS 171–202 (Carol 
Nackenoff & Julie Novkov eds., 2014); Sullivan & Nackenoff, supra note 13. 
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Pound, Ernst Freund, Julian Mack, and Louis Brandeis, were active in 
reform movements.  They saw room for the common law, police powers, 
and constitutional law to lead the way in adapting the law to changing 
circumstances. 
The courts were not, in their view, necessarily legislating from the 
bench, for “it is not the application of an existing principle to new cases, but 
the introduction of a new principle, which is properly termed judicial 
legislation.”21  Nor was judicial legislation viewed as necessarily 
illegitimate: 
This power has been constantly exercised by our judges, when 
applying to a new subject principles of private justice, moral 
fitness, and public convenience.  Indeed, the elasticity of our law, 
its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for growth, which 
has enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing society and 
to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been 
its greatest boast.22 
The common law has protected privacy in certain cases for well over a 
century, and granting the protections suggested here would merely be a 
further application of an existing rule.23  As Warren and Brandeis noted: 
“The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, 
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its 
commands.”24  Although Warren and Brandeis conceded that the boundary 
lines between consideration of “the dignity and convenience of the 
individual” and “the demands of the public welfare” could not be clearly 
drawn in advance of experience, they laid out several general principles for 
determining such boundaries, and for establishing when private rights of 
action for invasion of privacy would be warranted.25 
Brandeis was long a supporter of progressive reforms that extended the 
government’s reach into what some business owners and members of the 
public viewed as the realm of private decisionmaking.  He was especially 
concerned with modern technology and its capacity for intrusion into the 
private sphere, including the proclivity of the press to expose the private 
affairs of individuals for sensational and prurient interests.26  Newspapers 
could therefore debase tastes and cause blight and injury.27  Warren and 
Brandeis worried about the privacy of artists, writers, and collectors, as well 
                                                          
 21.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213 n.1. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 220. 
 25.  Id. at 214–20. 
 26.  See Richards, supra note 14, at 1303–04, 1306, 1339; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. 
 27.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. 
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as the privacy of persons of substance—especially those who were not 
candidates for public office.28 
While on the Supreme Court of the United States, Brandeis did not 
suppose that only common law protections for privacy were available; 
sometimes, there were constitutional protections.  Brandeis concluded as 
early as 1920 that state infringement of rights guaranteed protection by the 
United States Constitution should be reachable through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.29   
Meyer v. Nebraska30 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters31 reveal some of 
the situations in which the boundary cut in the direction of rights 
protection.32  In these cases, the Court concluded that the state has an 
interest in the physical, mental, and moral improvement of its citizens, an 
interest in fostering a people with American ideals, and an interest in 
teachers being patriotic and of good moral character, but individuals 
nevertheless retain certain fundamental rights.33  The state may certainly 
compel school attendance and regulate the curriculum, and may even 
require that English be taught, but barring instruction in a foreign language 
exceeds the power of the state.34  Nor could a state bar parental decisions to 
educate their children in private and parochial schools on the grounds that it 
slowed immigrant assimilation and provided inferior English language 
instruction.35  Brandeis’s understanding of privacy extended to thoughts, 
beliefs, emotions, and sensations, which was consistent with his 
concurrence in Whitney v. California,36 that the free exchange of ideas is 
vital to democracy.37 
                                                          
 28.  Id. at 195–99, 215; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 99–101 (2009). 
 29.  UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 619 (citing Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 30.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 31.  268 U.S. 510 (1925).  
 32.  Justice McReynolds authored Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.  Pierce 
was unanimous, but Justice Holmes (joined by Justice Sutherland) dissented in Meyer.  For Justice 
Holmes (in an argument that also extended to Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923), decided 
the same day), it was not unreasonable for Nebraska or Iowa to require that a student should hear 
or speak only English at school; the state’s measures were reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest and did not unduly restrict the liberty of teachers or scholars. 
 33.  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02. 
 34.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402–03. 
 35.  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
 36.  274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
 37.  Id. at 373.  Brandeis concurred with the majority only because the record below failed to 
raise the question of whether Whitney’s actions constituted “clear and imminent danger,” and the 
Court could not, in his view, raise the issue.  This failure to raise the issue warranted 
governmental interference with Whitney’s rights of speech and assembly.  Citing Meyer and 
Pierce, among others, for the proposition that the right of free speech, the right to teach, and the 
right of assembly are fundamental, Brandeis continued, “[b]ut, although the rights of free speech 
and assembly are fundamental, they are not, in their nature absolute.  Their exercise is subject to 
restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State from 
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Constitutional protections, too, evolve beyond the evils that gave rise 
to them, and Brandeis helped extend them.  He came to regard the Fourth 
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable search and seizures and the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination as integrally linked to 
privacy.38  In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,39 Brandeis contended 
that wiretapping telephone conversations to pursue violators of the National 
Prohibition Act was a breach of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment’s 
protections of “the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”40  
Quoting Weems v. United States’s language that “[t]ime works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes,” Brandeis argued that 
the right to be protected against government espionage or searches warrants 
broad construction.41  He reasoned that “[t]he makers of our 
Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men.”42 
One of the key questions in the right to privacy debate was what was 
of public or general interest.  This question was central to the Warren and 
Brandeis analysis of when the right to publish trumped the right to privacy.  
Stipulating what was of public interest, and why, was also central to the 
rationale progressives developed for removing children from dangerous 
home environments, for compulsory education, for limiting child labor, and 
for limiting work hours for women.  As an attorney, Brandeis had a hand in 
developing these arguments.  He was enlisted by the National Consumer’s 
League to defend Oregon’s law imposing an eight-hour limit for women in 
court.43  From that victory, he and Josephine Goldmark repeated the process 
in other states.44  Brandeis worked with progressive reformers in defense of 
minimum wage and maximum hours legislation, as well as other reform 
causes.45  He supported workers’ efforts to unionize and believed business 
                                                          
destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.”  He pointed to Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), for the proposition about limits on rights.  See PHILIPPA STRUM, 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 306–07 (1984); Philippa Strum, Brandeis, Louis 
D. 1856–1941, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 188, 190 
(David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008). 
 38.  UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 630. 
 39.  277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 40.  Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)).  Justice Holmes and Justice Stone joined Justice Brandeis’ dissent.  Justice Butler filed a 
separate dissent. 
 41.  Id. at 472–73 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
 42.  Id. at 478. 
 43.  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 248 (1946). 
 44.  See NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN 
WORKERS, 1890S–1990S, at 87–89 (2015). 
 45.  On the range of reform causes with which Brandeis was associated, see UROFSKY, supra 
note 28, at 331, and Strum, supra note 37, at 188–91.  See also Justice Holmes’s dissent, which 
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had an obligation to be socially responsible, all while refusing to be paid for 
his services on behalf of the public.46  The police power, even if not always 
named, was frequently the vehicle for asserting the power of the state over 
such matters of public concern. 
II.  WHEN A MAN’S HOME IS NOT HIS CASTLE 
Household governance had historically been viewed as private 
governance; therefore the question of under what circumstances the state 
could exercise internal authority over members of the household 
necessitated changes in this public-private relationship.  The King’s duty to 
maximize the welfare of the realm—his household, in effect—included 
using his authority as pater patriae through disciplinary measures.  
Restraining pernicious vices that endangered the public was considered part 
of this power.47  Juvenile court proponents invoked this power, calling it 
parens patriae, to remove juveniles from the criminal justice system and 
work for their rehabilitation in a less rule-bound and more fatherly 
(motherly?) court system.48 
Roscoe Pound received great attention in the initial years of the 
twentieth century for his assertions that the social interest required state 
protection.  The sovereign, he wrote, is “the guardian of social interests,” 
and “[a]s social institutions, state and law exist for social ends, and from the 
beginning have recognized and secured individual interests as a means 
thereto”; but “the law does not secure individuals in the free exercise of 
their faculties for the purpose of injuring others, since obvious social 
interests are opposed to such a claim.”49  The overemphasis on 
individualism in American common law, Pound argued, “exaggerates 
private right at the expense of public right,” contrary to the interest of the 
                                                          
Justice Brandeis joined, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), arguing that 
Congress has the power to regulate child labor.  
 46.  Strum, supra note 37, at 188–91. 
 47.  See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 58 (2005) on Blackstone and Chapter 2, generally, on Blackstone’s 
Police. 
 48.  Mack, supra note 19.  A good part of this defense of pater patriae would be rejected by 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), with Justice Abe Fortas writing for the majority and making 
explicit the Court’s rejection of Mack’s rationale, where the individual rights of juveniles were 
increasingly held to require the formal protections afforded the accused by the Bill of Rights.  I 
note “motherly” because the principal architects of the juvenile court in Chicago were female; 
Pound and Mack worked with these female reformers.  Freund worked extensively with another 
female-led reform project, the Immigrants’ Protective League, and its chief architect, Grace 
Abbott. 
 49.  Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 345, 347, 362 
(respectively) (1915). 
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modern community.50  Society needs—and the public wants—protection 
against individuals and the excesses of individualism.51 
At the turn of the twentieth century, there was a rather pervasive view 
that state exercises of police power were beyond constitutional scrutiny in 
the United States.  State exercises of police power were viewed as policy 
measures; only by reclassifying them as criminal could substantive and 
procedural criminal law or constitutional law reach them.52  As Martin 
Dubber noted, “the police concept can immunize state acts inconsistent with 
basic principles of substantive and procedural criminal law.”53  During the 
early years of the twentieth century, until Hammer v. Dagenhart54 restricted 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, the federal government 
also enacted morals legislation through its commerce power.  There was 
only so much the states could do to police on their own.  In Champion v. 
Ames,55 the Supreme Court upheld the federal regulation of traffic in lottery 
tickets by a narrow majority.  The Court reasoned that “we should hesitate 
long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on 
through interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power 
competent to that end.”56  In practice, “the federal government enjoyed 
wide ranging police powers, of which the power to police immigrants as 
threats to the public police was but one example.”57 
But in the early twentieth century, the police power was quite ill-
defined.58  Ernst Freund wrote in his classic treatment of the subject that 
“[t]he term police power, while in constant use and indispensable in the 
vocabulary of American constitutional law, has remained without 
authoritative or generally accepted definition.”59  After inventorying ways 
in which the term is used in Blackstone’s Commentaries, Freund noted that 
“the general tendency is to identify it with the whole of internal government 
                                                          
 50.  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909).  The overemphasis on 
individualism in American common law was also “hostile to legislation.”  Id. 
 51.  RABBAN, supra note 13, at 433–35 (citing, among other sources, Roscoe Pound, Common 
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 403 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a 
Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 
GREEN BAG 607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 AM. L. REV. 811, 
815 (1911)). 
 52.  DUBBER, supra note 47, at 137–38. 
 53.  Id. at 143. 
 54.  247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 55.  188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 56.  Id. at 357–58 (Harlan, J.); see also JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 130–32 (2014). 
 57.  DUBBER, supra note 47, at 143. 
 58.  Id. at 120. 
 59.  ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iii 
(1904). 
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and sovereignty, and to regard it as an undefined mass of legislation.”60  
Freund quite notably defined police power as “the power of promoting the 
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and 
property.”61 The police power “aims directly to secure and promote the 
public welfare, and it does so by restraint and compulsion”; it is not a fixed 
quantity but elastic, and capable of development.62  Freund’s definition of 
police power included the regulation of work hours, compulsory school 
attendance, restraints on the employment of children, and restraints upon 
parental rights of control over delinquent children.  These examples come 
only from his discussion of control of dependents.63  The police power 
clearly stood in opposition to the right to be let alone.64 
Police power in the earlier years of the nation allowed for the 
regulation of public morals, preservation of order, and maintenance of 
standards of decency.  It has been commonly argued that, “legal support for 
morals restriction barely wavered in the nineteenth century.”65  Morals 
nuisance legislation (for example, against disorderly houses) and anti-liquor 
legislation were pervasive, and by the 1850s, in order to deal with such 
traditional moral evils, state courts had defined state police powers quite 
broadly.66  Historian William Novak argued that there is a difference 
between nineteenth- and twentieth-century morals regulation: “[O]nly after 
twentieth-century constitutional innovations like privacy and civil liberties 
could one expect anything remotely approaching laissez-faire or caveat 
emptor in morals.”67  Although Warren and Brandeis argued that, at the end 
of the nineteenth century, common law generally recognized that “a man’s 
house is his castle,” that was not the reality.68  The house was not—and 
would not become—the quintessentially private sphere that the authors 
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described.69  The salus populi tradition was one that permitted communities 
to “defend themselves aggressively by imposing stringent requirements of 
orderliness on all spaces and activities.”70  And arguably, there would not 
follow any clean break with a tradition of morals regulation. 
Progressive reformers, including Roscoe Pound, who became famous 
for arguing that the common law needed to change to become better attuned 
to the times, often justified their concern in terms of growing public 
sympathy for the “underdog.”71  By the first decade of the twentieth 
century, a marked movement for judicial reform was underway—to 
dispense justice, courts needed to be modern, efficient, and fair to the poor 
and vulnerable.  Pound’s paper about the court system delivered before the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1906 became a rallying cry for 
reform and prompted the ABA to recommend a set of changes that included 
improvement in the administration of the courts.72 Pound, noting that “real 
and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law . . . exists 
in the United States today,” declared that “our system of courts is archaic 
and our procedure behind the times.”73  The modernization of the urban 
court system—of which the Cook County juvenile court stood for Pound as 
a fine example—brought new assumptions, concerns, and state practices to 
bear in what Pound called “the socialization of law.”74  This process 
involved “adjusting the law, shaped by the individualism of the past three 
centuries, to the ideal of social justice of the twentieth century.”75  Pound 
criticized courts for mechanical reasoning, but the judicial elites he 
addressed were generally quite receptive to calls for the courts to address 
social and economic ills.76  Dean John Henry Wigmore of Northwestern 
University, who had hired Pound in 1907, noted in 1917 that common law 
judges were constantly making law, and “our own Supreme Courts have 
long been drawing copiously and consciously from this unbounded field of 
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public policy.”77  Reform of the legal system helped enable courts to play 
an important role in developing new conceptions of rights and warrants for 
government intrusions of the home. 
Hull-House-influenced reformers who had pressed for the formation of 
the juvenile court after experimenting with reforms in Chicago, and then 
helped spread the gospel to the rest of the country, were especially 
determined to include immigrants and the working class in participatory 
democratic ventures; civic knowledge grew only as they shaped goals 
together.  The juvenile court and other specialized courts designed in this 
period were supposed to learn, change, and grow through interaction with 
those the institutions served.78  Pragmatism required flexibility. 
III.  WHAT KIND OF RIGHTS SERVED PROGRESSIVE REFORM INTERESTS? 
The kind of legal flexibility many of these progressive reformers 
sought in order to develop dynamic, iterative responses to social problems 
was more easily found through appeals to police power and development of 
the common law than through statutory authority that was often difficult to 
revisit and amend.  This conclusion, however, may not have been clear to 
those pragmatist reformers who hoped that statutory law and administrative 
procedures could develop in more flexible and participatory directions.  
Additionally, the language of social good and social progress was steeped 
in a vision of a larger community interest.  Individualism, or expressions of 
individual self-interest, were deemed outmoded and unsuited to goals for 
new, twentieth-century citizenship.79  A bright-line conception of 
constitutional rights based on individual self-interest and a right to be let 
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alone, then, was not consistent with the kind of flexibility that good, 
progressive policymaking sought. 
The fact that progressive reform did not love unalloyed appeals to 
rights suggests a few possibilities.  First, a balancing approach to rights 
might more easily permit the government to advance important social 
welfare and police power interests (especially at the state level) than would 
a fundamental rights approach.  Second, the notion of a “person” who is 
entitled to privacy may not include everyone.  Third, if one’s home is one’s 
castle, it is also likely that not everyone had a proper “home.”  Any of these 
possibilities could help us make sense of how a number of progressive 
reformers, Brandeis among them, understood public-private boundaries. 
The fact that neither Brandeis nor any other liberal justice dissented 
from Justice Holmes’s 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell80 suggests that these 
possibilities merit serious consideration.  In his famous Olmstead dissent, 
just prior to a much more famous quote that appears earlier in this Paper, 
Brandeis remarked on Buck: 
We have likewise held that general limitations on the powers of 
Government, like those embodied in the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United 
States or the States from meeting modern conditions by 
regulations which “a century ago, or even half a century ago, 
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.81 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments prohibited warrantless telephone 
wire taps because they violated privacy rights, but as Justice Holmes wrote 
in Buck: 
[T]he public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their 
lives.  It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, 
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent 
our being swamped with incompetence.82 
Government intervention in bodily integrity was not necessarily an 
unwarranted foray into the private sphere—there were competing social 
considerations.  There seemed to be no elevated scrutiny of decisions made 
public officials about the public welfare in this sphere.  It cannot be, then, 
that the right to be let alone was understood as a hard barrier against 
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measures seen as promoting what progressive reformers understood as 
social welfare measures.  The long public tradition of regulating moral 
nuisances in the name of a well-regulated society83 found continuing 
expression in a generous—and sometimes remarkably implicit—acceptance 
of certain exercises of police power. 
“Home” had a moral dimension to Progressive Era reformers.  Much 
like their predecessors and successors, they sought to police homes of those 
who had come to the attention of public agencies and courts.  For earlier 
generations, disorder authorized public action; the welfare of the people, the 
common law of nuisance, and the expectation that an owner would use his 
or her own so as not to injure another all supported that conclusion.84  But 
the nineteenth century authorization of public regulation did not simply 
disappear with the rise of privacy concerns and constitutional protections 
thereof.  Not everyone enjoyed the same level of protection. 
Juvenile court probation officers in the early years of the twentieth 
century, for example, visited the homes of young people, collecting data 
and working to purge the home environment of harmful influences.85  
Beyond offering friendly guidance, probation officers helped procure 
services for the family and also functioned somewhat like latter-day social 
workers.86  They could attempt to relocate family residences to remove 
temptations and unhealthy influences on the young.  In extreme cases, they 
could insist upon removal of the child from the home.87  Evidence suggests 
that such removals were far more common in the case of African American 
children than white ones.  Mothers’ pensions, administered by juvenile 
courts, were also more likely to be awarded to white mothers to keep the 
family intact.88  Workers in the juvenile court system were not the only 
ones allowed to intervene in homes and residential spaces.  The Chicago-
based Immigrants’ Protective League, wielding quasi-public powers, 
attempted to make sure that young women arriving in Chicago were only 
released into the hands of responsible relatives, and not lodged in co-ed 
boarding houses.89  They sent “friendly visitors” to follow up with repeat 
visits.90  These boarding houses could pose dangers to the young, and to 
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vulnerable urban newcomers.  And dangerous homes and residential spaces 
could further endanger the public. 
IV.  LEGACIES 
Later generations of reformers also crafted social welfare policies that 
intruded upon the home and of middle-class expectations of privacy in the 
name of progress and the public interest.  Welfare programs, including 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), “subordinate[] 
recipients to a series of requirements, sanctions, and stacked incentives 
aimed at rectifying their personal choices and family practices.”  By 
accepting welfare, “TANF recipients must surrender or compromise their 
vocational freedom, sexual privacy, and reproductive choice, as well as the 
right to make intimate decisions about how to be and raise a family.”91 
Further complicating privacy, homes were seen as posing potential 
dangers because of their physical condition, layout, and location.92  
Substandard homes and urban blight were considered dangers to the public.  
Progressive Era reformers and their New Deal heirs considered certain 
qualities necessary to the very concept of “home.”  The basic, adequate 
home had certain prerequisites in terms of personal space and opportunities 
for privacy, natural lighting, plumbing, heating, access to fresh air, yard 
space, and other amenities.  By the early 1920s, these standards were being 
disseminated across the nation by Better Homes in America and local 
chapters of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs.  In the 1930s, they 
were enshrined in home mortgage underwriting standards that disqualified 
the overwhelming majority of then-existing urban residences from 
mortgage insurance.93 
The Court continues to develop protections of the private realm.  One 
important recent declaration is found in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,94 part of the prelude to the right of 
same-sex couples to marry:95 
Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.”  These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
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choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.96 
Should we uncritically accept this claim about the trajectory of privacy 
and Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests at face value? 
During the Progressive Era, some gained more privilege with 
recognition of privacy rights, while public power was used to regulate the 
bodies, behavior, homes, and lives of others.  This tension involving “a 
heightened American rhetoric of individual liberty with a constant and 
historic readiness to employ the coercive state powers of regulation and 
police” did not disappear with the constitutional celebration of liberty.97  A 
narrative that suggests privacy, equal protection, and constitutional 
protection for a number of individual rights displaced the common law and 
police power has serious limitations if it neglects the differential access of 
persons under the jurisdiction of the laws of the state and the nation to 
rights to be let alone. 
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